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The Board: A Change Agent? 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide insight into why shareholders often 
claim dissatisfaction with the results delivered by their boards. A central reason is that 
boards fail to get their critical decisions effectively implemented. The paper also 
focuses on whether boards apply essentials developed in the change management 
discipline. 
Design /methodology/approach – The research is based on a study of board 
documents to capture what boards actually do.  The documents were compiled from 
two Norwegian companies during the 1993–2005 period. A content analysis was the 
analytic tool.  
Findings – The research indicates that boards apply rational and deterministic 
approaches to implement critical decisions. It also reveals that boards tend to overlook 
essentials from the change management discipline. The paper identifies the potential 
for improved board effectiveness in implementing critical decisions. 
Research limitations/implication – The main limitation of this research is that 
several observations may threaten the generalizability of the findings. However, the 
limitations may provide opportunities for further research. 
Practical implications – Boards should motivate the chief executive officer and top 
management to apply a change management perspective in implementing critical 
decisions. To do so, board members must understand the critical decisions and ask 
appropriate questions.  
Originality/value – The main value of this paper pertains to the contribution 
regarding why shareholders claim dissatisfaction with board-delivered results. 
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Introduction 
A common observation in the literature is that shareholders claim dissatisfaction with 
the results delivered by boards (Cadbury, 1997; Huse and Schøning, 2005; Stiles and 
Taylor, 2002; Useem, 2003). One reason boards fail to deliver the expected results is 
that their critical decision tend to be wrong (Useem, 2003), another is that they fail to 
get their decisions effectively implemented. This article addresses the role of boards 
in implementing their critical decisions.  
 
Several board models exist (Huse, 1998; Sundby, 2004). The actual board model 
influences the role of boards in making and implementing critical decisions. This 
research is based on Norwegian boards and thus focuses primarily on the Norwegian 
board model that is defined by the Norwegian Company Law. The law specifies two 
organizational levels, namely the board and the chief executive officer (CEO). The 
board is accountable for administration, control of the company, and that the company 
is suitable organized. The board is legally the highest authority in the company and 
thus is accountable for ensuring that critical decisions are made and effectively 
implemented (Andersen et al 1997; Monks and Minow, 2004; Stiles and Taylor, 
2002; Sundby, 2004). The board appoints the CEO, who in turn is accountable for the 
daily operations of the company and reports to the board (Andersen et al., 1997; 
Huse, 1998; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Furthermore, the board must cooperate 
with the CEO in the administration of the company while controlling the CEO’s 
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performance to ensure that the organization works effectively (Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003; Sundby, 2004). These responsibilities imply some overlapping duties 
between the board and the CEO, and a dualistic role for the board towards the CEO. 
Such a dual role requires trust and good relations between the parties to work 
effectively (Huse 1998, Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). However, relationships 
between the parties that are too close could create a situation in which the board does 
not feel comfortable making decisions that are in the best interests of the company. 
Thus, too close relationship could harm the integrity of the board (Kolltveit and Reve, 
2002).  
 
In addition to the Company Law, company specific documents (e.g. board instruction, 
articles of associations, shareholders agreement, company ethics) also influence the 
role of Norwegian boards. The division of accountability, the overlapping duties, and 
the need for trust between the parties create a situation in which active board 
participation in the implementation of major critical decisions could change the 
balance of roles and thereby negatively affect the organizational effectiveness. This 
indicates that the Norwegian board model is sensitive to the freedom of boards to 
become actively involved in the implementation of critical decisions. A critical aspect 
is that major decisions usually involve change. 
 
To ensure effective decisions making, boards have four possible options. First, boards 
can delegate both decision making and implementation to the CEO and the top 
management. Second, they can make the decisions and delegate the implementation to 
the CEO and management. Third, they can make the decisions and take an active role 
in the implementation of the decisions. Fourth, they can make the decisions and 
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actively stimulate and motivate the CEO and management to lead the change 
processes required by effective implementation.  
 
The first option is a passive board approach, in which the board in reality abdicates its 
accountability (Stiles and Taylor 2002, p. 19).  
 
The second option is based on the assumption that the formal power of the board are 
binding for the CEO and the rest of the organization, implying that a board decision 
will be accepted by the organization’s members and effectively implemented (Bolman 
and Deal 1996:169; Stiles and Taylor 2002).  However, this option may easily lead to 
the consequence that vital organizational processes are overlooked or ignored (e.g. 
because of resistance to change and the need for user involvement). Furthermore, the 
employees may perceive the board as passive and abdicating from its accountability. 
If so, the desired changes will fizzle out or take another direction even if the board 
decision is highly relevant (Mohrman & Mohrman, 1997).  
 
Boards that select the third option, the executive board approach, may harme their 
relationships with the CEO and change the balance of the roles underlying the 
Norwegian board model. This may create frustration on the part of management and 
have a negative impact on organizational effectiveness (Huse, 1998; Sundaramurthy 
and Lewis, 2003; Sundby, 2004).   
 
The fourth option implies that the board makes the critical decisions and actively 
stimulates the CEO and the rest of the management team to lead the implementation, 
including the required change processes. This option, which we consider the most 
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viable for the Norwegian board model, requires a change management perspective 
and a change agent role for the board in implementation (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
2003). These four decision-making options provide background for the following 
research question:  
 
R1. How active are Norwegian boards as change agents in the implementation 
of critical decisions? 
 
The remaining part of this article is organized as follows: In the next three sections, 
we clarify our definition of the central concepts that is, change agent, the role of 
boards, implementation, and critical decisions. We do so to clarify the conceptual 
basis underlying the research. Then, we explain the research methodology and report 
our data collection and analyses. The last section draws conclusions and highlights 
implications. 
 
Central concepts and theoretical assumptions 
Change agent 
Prior research has used the term “change agent” in many ways, but no globally 
accepted definition currently exists. Huse (1980) uses the terms “change agent” and 
“organizational developer” as synonyms and argues that “the person appears to be 
able to develop integrative solutions that bring together and reconcile viewpoints 
between opposing organizational groups”. Developing integrative solutions and 
reconciling viewpoints between opposing groups require understanding, acceptance, 
and leadership of change processes. Nutt (1986) states that “change agents were 
manager-sponsors who took control of planned change processes”. This definition 
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underscores the importance of leading the change processes. Tosi et al. (1994) claim 
that “change agents seek to enhance the capacity and motivation of the involved to 
learn, improve, and change through their own efforts in the future”. They emphasize 
development through human growth and improvement. This definition implies that 
the change agents attempt to achieve the intended changes by motivating the involved 
parties to learn and improve the situation through their own efforts. Greenberg and 
Baron (1997) argue that change agents are “people who get results when they are 
needed most. Such persons seem to combine proactive attitudes, the belief that things 
can get better with the ability to motivate others”. This definition emphasizes that the 
change agent must motivate the involved parties and show leadership of change 
processes to achieve the expected results and goals.  Bridges (2003) argues that a 
change agent is “a person who knows how to enter an organization, often from 
outside, and change things”. This definition emphasizes that change agents must 
understand what is required in terms of timing, urgency, change processes, and the 
ability to lead these processes. 
 
These aforementioned quotes support the contention that no globally accepted 
definition of change agent exists. Nevertheless, we find the following definition 
suitable for use in this research: “Change agents seek to enhance the capacity and 
motivation of the involved to learn, improve, and change through their own efforts in 
the future” (Tosi et al., 1994).  
 
The roles of boards 
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A role reflects the party’s expectations to the attitudes of a person in a position as well 
as the expectation this person has to her- or himself. This means that a board’s role 
should mirrors the expectations to the board. 
 
The most effective board role depends on the actual situation, implying that an 
effective board should be able to have more than one role (Stiles and Taylor, 2002). 
Stiles and Taylor (2002) find that five theoretical perspectives have been applied in 
discussions of board roles: the agency, stewardship, resource dependence, class 
hegemony, and the managerial hegemony perspective. Grandori (2004, p. 1) claims 
that the agency perspective is the dominant view, implying that the principal delegates 
work for the benefit of the agent. Furthermore, a board is legally required to act in the 
interest of the shareholders but must delegate the execution of work to the CEO 
(Cadbury, 1992, Stiles and Taylor, 2002). However, criticism has been voiced against 
the agency perspective because it may lead to ambiguities related to the roles of 
boards, such as whose interests the boards should represent and which means are 
available for the execution of the boards’ formal power (Grandori, 2004; Mintzberg, 
1983).  Implicitly, the law provides for every means, including the right to make or 
override every decision in the organization. However, a board cannot continually 
supervise its management. That is, boards can only manage to make or control some 
of the decisions and should give priority to the critical decisions (Scott, 2003). This 
means that “even a board that is intent on control” has to select a CEO, in most cases 
one that shares the board´s general views, and delegate the management of the 
organization to him or her (Mintzberg 1983:69). Boards may, however, reserve the 
right to make or control decisions, and sometimes overrule management decisions 
(ibid). This can have several positive effects, including  keeping the management alert 
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and preventing the perception that the board is passive and trying to abdicate 
accountability (Stiles and Taylor, 2002). These aspects could be important because, 
according to Mace (1971, pp. 187-188), board members do not ask “discerning 
questions”, and that for most board meetings the minutes could have been written in 
advance.    
 
The above observations reveal that different views prevail. Thus, Stiles & Taylor 
(2002:10) claim that little consensus exists “on what boards of directors are actually 
supposed to do”. There are, however, some similarities in the authors’ views on board 
roles, i.e. control, appointing and removing CEO, and external communication. In 
addition, there is an ongoing worldwide process of improving corporate governance 
by developing codes of good governance, that is norms for the composition and roles 
of the board (Cadbury, 1997; Cuervo-Cazurra and Aguliera, 2004; Monks, and 
Minow 2004). This development process began in the United States during the late 
1970s as a response to the development of corporate criminal behaviour. The process 
has subsequently expanded to most developed countries, in particular after the well-
known “Cadbury Report” was issued in 1992 (Cuervo-Cazurra and Aguliera, 2004). 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Aguliera (2004) claim that though the codes for good corporate 
governance vary from country to country, they are all based on the same two 
principles: (1) norms for adequate disclosure and (2) norms for appropriate control in 
the governance structure. Although the codes are voluntary, companies tend to adopt 
them (Cadbury, 2002 Cuervo-Cazurra and Aguliera, 2005; Monks and Minow, 2004). 
The recommendations for good governance in Norway were issued at the end of 2004 
(Ask et al., 2004). There is, however, some criticism against the Norwegian 
recommendations because they focus primarily on companies listed on the Oslo Stock 
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Exchange. Still, the process may lead to consensus about what should be expected 
from Norwegian boards. 
 
Implementation 
Several views and perspectives exist on implementation. For example, Baier et al. 
(1986) state that “IS systems are implemented when the programmes are adopted,” 
and Nutt (1986) concludes that systems are implemented when “changes are 
installed”. Wooldridge (1992) takes this further by claiming that new systems are 
implemented when “organisation acts on new priorities”. Gottschalk (1999) defines 
implementation as ”the process of completing the projects for application of 
information technology to assist an organisation in realising its goals”. Gray and 
Larson (2003) focus on the implementation gap, which they define as “the lack of 
consensus between the goals set by the top management and those independently set 
by lower levels of management”. They argue that this lack of consensus leads to 
confusion and poor allocation of organizational resources. Olson (2001, p. 214) 
supports this point by stating, “User acceptance and knowledge acquirement are 
important elements of implementation”.  For this research we find the definition of 
Wooldridge (1992) “new systems are implemented when organisation acts on new 
priorities” most suitable. 
 
The change management perspective   
Change management (CM) is a discipline that specifically addresses organizational 
change situations similar to those that occur when implementing critical decisions. 
The idea behind the CM perspective is to treat change as a normal organizational 
element (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002) and to show that planned changes are required 
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when continuous change fails (Beer and Walton, 1987; Weick and Quinn, 1999). 
According to Mohrmans and Mohrmans’s (1997) findings and a framework inspired 
by Bechard and Harris (1987)  Lewin (1947), it seems reasonable to conclude that in 
order to achieve the intended situation, the organization has to change in a way that 
corresponds with the purpose of making the decision. Such changes are fundamental 
in the implementation of critical decisions and cannot be achieved by only introducing 
new management ideas, redrawing the structural map, or introducing new 
technologies. Rather, they require acceptance, understanding and learning of what is 
needed to perform as intended in the new situation. Such changes are challenging 
tasks, requiring processes that must be led. Communication, training and participation 
are vital element of such processes (Eccles, 1994).  
 
 
The purpose of applying a change management perspective on implementation is to 
transform the idea of a new organizational reality into collective actions. This task can 
be as transforming the “discursive” consciousness and competence about the future 
into practical and collective actions, in which situations are understood in new ways 
and other priorities are made (Giddens, 1984), which also requiring new patterns of 
cooperation and communication supported by the new and/or changed systems.  
Thus, we propose that the CM perspective on implementation is the only suitable one 
for the Norwegian board model and is the basis for this research.  
 
 
Critical decisions   
According to Scott (2003), critical decisions are those that result in structural changes. 
Such decisions will result over time in the development of a specific structure of the 
organization. This definition of critical decisions corresponds to some extent with 
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Mintzberg’s (1979) definition of strategic decisions, in which strategic decisions are 
“significant in their impact on the organization” (e.g. the selection of customers, the 
market to serve, the nature and timing of formalization of the structures). In addition, 
Minzberg uses the term “administrative decisions” to refer to decisions that are 
“coordinative and exceptional” (e.g. budgeting, selection of the CEO, the decision to 
implement a new Enterprise Resource Planning system). Thus, the term critical 
decisions comprise both strategic and important administrative decisions.  
 
Research methodology  
Our initial research question can be investigated in various ways, for example, by 
observing board meetings, interviewing board members, or studying board 
documents. Here, we chose the last approach. The advantage of reviewing board 
documents is that they represent unobtrusive data to capture what boards actually do 
(Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981; Stiles and Taylor, 2002).  
 
Her we compiled documents from two Norwegian companies capturing three strategic 
decisions in detail. Each decision encompasses multiple observations and activities. The 
choice of a limited number of companies and decisions is based on the need for detailed 
mapping to capture the real impact of the boards. Also, the actual research approach is very 
labour-intensive, and access to such data are more than limited. With the chosen approach one 
cannot talk about representativeness in a traditional sense. However, detailed mapping of a 
limited number can yield important insights with regard to characteristics of the board´s roles 
and what they emphasis. Past research has demonstrated important insight allowing for 
interpretation and theorizing. One example is the classical contribution “Observation of a 
Business Decision” based on one case, a longitudinal study of the implementation of a 
computer – which also is one of the central inputs to Simon´s famous theory (Cyert, Simon, 
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and Trow 1956). Another example is Dill´s famous article “Environment as an influence on 
Managerial Anatomy” (Dill1958). This article, based on the study of two firms, is a central 
input to contingency theory in organization science as well as to the classical book 
“Organizations in action” (J.D.Thompson 1967).   
 
With few exceptions, the present database contains all the documents that the board 
members received during this period, such as agendas, minutes of meetings, decision 
proposals, analyses, critical documents, planning and monitoring documents, and 
letters.  
 
The first author was a board member of the two Norwegian companies during the 
defined period. Thus, the objectivity of this research might be questioned. However, 
the acquired insight as a board member might allow for a more correct interpretation 
of the written messages. In addition, two professors and professional researchers 
actively participated in the interpretation of the gathered data. 
.    
A content analysis was applied to examine the board documents,. This approach 
requires development of specific categories for registration of observations that can be 
used to enlighten the research question. Developing the categories is a key activity in 
content analysis (Straus and Corbin, 1998).  
 
Development of categories 




The first observations, reported by Mohrmans and Mohrmans (1997) and a framework 
inspired by Bechard and Harris (1987), state that “to achieve the intended situation, 
the organization has to change in a way that corresponds with the purpose of 
launching a critical decision”. This implies that the right change processes must be 
applied. In addition it was observed that key stakeholders must clarify the advantages 
expected to be achieved and which changes that are required at an early stage of the 
implementation (Carnall, 1995). In addition, people need time to undergo major 
change because it requires that the involved parties collectively think and act 
differently. Thus, management must spend time with people in a change situation and 
listen to their views. To do so, they need to clarify what the desired change is. Thus, 
the desired change should be defined as soon as possible after the critical decision is 
taken. These observations became the basis for developing the following categories 
for registration of observations: (1) formulation of the decision and (2) clarification of 
the desired change. 
 
The next three observations are, according to the authors, preconditions for the 
desired change to take place.  Anell and Wilson (2000) claim that the ability of top 
management to predict the need for and implementation of the desired changes is one 
precondition. Kotter (1996) argues that to establish a sense of urgency is another. The 
third is to communicate a compelling reason for the critical decision (Beer et al., 
1990; Eisenstat and Spector, 1990; Mohrmann and Mohrmann, 1997). These three 
preconditions should be integrated into the concept of change agent. Therefore, there 
was a need for observing whether the boards focused on these issues. Thus, we 
arrived at the following three categories for registration of observations. The first two 
were formulated directly, on the basis of the previous findings, and the third was 
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added to clarify what boards should achieve by the critical decision: (3) preconditions 
for effective implementation, (4) the reason for the decision, and (5) the vision and 
goals for the decision. 
  
Another finding in the CM literature is based on Tichy and Sherman’s (1995) 
argument that for boards to achieve the intended situation, the change processes must 
gradually alter the organization. This implies that it is challenging to develop and 
sustain processes that create a momentum for change (Hennestad, 1998; Mohrmann 
and Mohrmann, 1997). In addition, when implementing critical decisions, firms 
should acknowledge the concept of transition as a force field between the change 
forces and the restraining forces that keeping the organisation on “the old track”, 
rather than in a linear and deterministic movement. This force field must change 
before the organizational change to take place (Schein, 1996:27). Thus, the force-field 
concept involves “unfreezing” the organizational patterns, “moving” or constructing 
new patterns, and then “refreezing” or institutionalizing the new situation (Weick and 
Quinn, 1999). Many authors have applied such deterministic stage models as a 
guiding framework (Burke, 2003; Chapman and Ward, 2002; Harrington et al., 2000; 
Jessen, 2002; Karlsen and Gottschalk, 2005; Kerzner, 2003;, Marchewka, 2003, 
Søderlund, 2005, Karlsen, Gottschalk 2005). A common experience is, however, that 
organizational dynamics make it necessary to move back and forth between the steps 
or stages. This is because the deterministic stage model thinking does not capture the 
dynamic nature of organizations, embedded in ever-changing environments (Beer & 
Walton 1987, Collins, 1998, Beer, 2003). The concept of “force field” also focuses on 
the liminal nature of the transition period. The term “liminality” connotes the non-
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deterministic nature of such a transitional situation that calls for continuous change 
management to secure implementation as intended.  
 
Carnall (1995) suggests that a force-field analysis may be helpful when planning the 
transition. This concept includes a definition of strengths and weaknesses in the 
present situation. Furthermore, based on an analysis of interest, the force-field 
analysis identifies the forces working for and against the desired changes. It also 
highlights the forces that are believed to be the most important. Finally, the parties 
involved should agree on the actions that seem to best help overcome the resistance to 
the desired change. Participation from the involved is an important process element to 
achieve such agreement. 
 
 These observations are important for understanding the role of a change agent. In 
addition, they highlight other main challenges related to change processes and 
emphasize some aspects that are vital for the change agents when developing 
strategies and plans for the successful implementation of changes. Therefore, we 
wanted to determine whether the boards focus on these issues. Thus, the 
aforementioned findings became the basis for developing the following four 
categories: (6) strategy for achieving the required change, (7) planning of the change 
processes, (8) potential change powers and (9) potential resistance to change. 
 
We also observe from the CM literature that in the liminal period, the established 
cognitive schemata that provided order in everyday life no longer apply. In terms of 
an “as-if” reality, in which “wishes, desires and hypothesis reign”, they constitute an 
environment for reflexivity and creativity regarding aspects such as roles and 
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relationships (Feldman, 1990).  One way to consider the organizational dynamics in  
period is to assume that the outcome of the change initiatives will be the result of a 
complex interplay between the change and the organizational forces in action. This 
process can be understood by structuration theory, according to which the pre-existing 
social structure guides and constrains the agency that transforms or reproduces the 
social structure (Giddens, 1984). To implement new ideas or systems in ways they are 
intended, the agency must consist of  “a lot of soft wiring as well as hard wiring” 
meaning that new ideas as well as new systems are required to support them (Bate et 
al., 2000; Higgins and Mcallaster, 2004). The need for continuous change 
management during the whole transition period is an important lesson for firms and 
should be the basis for planning the implementation effort (Tsoukas and Chia 2002). 
Further, implementation requires acceptance of an approach build on the need for 
“self-design” for which accompanying change and learning are required (Orgland, 
1998; Popper and Lipshitz, 1998). Such a change approach is a challenging task that 
requires processes that boards must lead (Eccles, 1994). These activities for change 
should be basic knowledge, and thus we examined whether the boards focus on them. 
These findings formed the basis for developing the following category of 
observations: (10) leading change processes. 
 
From a CM perspective, implementation of change processes must occur in a back-
and forth manner so that feedback is received; this is also known as “implementation 
learning”. Effective back-and-forth processes requires evaluation. To enable 
evaluation of the involved processes, feedback is needed about many process 
elements, such as management involvement, participation, communication, the 
achieved changes, the change and restraining powers, and conflicts. Change agents 
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must recognise the need for such processes. Thus, we needed to determine whether 
the boards actually focused on these issues based on the following categories: (11) 
feedback about the overall implementation, (12) feedback about management 
involvement, (13) feedback about achieved changes, (14) feedback about change 
powers, (15) feedback about resistance to change, (16) feedback about conflicts, (17), 
monitoring of further activities, and (8) evaluation of results 
 
After the required categories of observations were clarified, the next step was to 
identify the decisions to be studied. Based on the discussion of critical decisions, it 
was decided to investigate three decisions that the boards of the two Norwegian 
companies made. The firms got the label Company 1 and 2, respectively, because of 
anonymity reasons. The three decisions are as follows: 
Decision 1: To select a critical information technology (IT) partner 
  (Company 1). 
Decision 2: To change the internal, national, and international infrastructure 
(Company 1). 
Decision 3: To merge the company with another company 
(Company 2). 
 
Decision 1 pertains to the selection of an IT company, which Company 1 acquired as 
a subsidiary company of Company 1. This decision was critical because the acquiring 
Company, a rather traditional logistic company, desperately needed more IT 
knowledge and capacity. The decision would have a major impact on the company 
structure. The acquired company was known for having such expertise and capacity. 
Decision 2 was critical because the existing internal, national, and international 
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infrastructure of Company 1 did not match the increased competition. The new 
infrastructure implied major changes in the organizational structure of the company. 
The board of Company 2, a state-owned company, made Decision 3 to acquire 
another company. In this case, the acquired company was integrated into the 
organizational structure of Company 2. The reason behind this decision was to expand 
the company to deliver complete services to the benefit of its customers, implying 
major structural changes.  
 
The next step in the research was to identify the documents in the database that 
contained information related to the three decisions. Then, detailed analyses of the 
selected documents were performed, and observations according to the following 
principles (Strauss and Corbin, 1998):   
x(i, j)where:  x = the actual document,   
i is the category, and j = the number of observations 
 
The next step was to eliminate spurious observations, that is observations that were 
highlighted in the documents for reasons other than the actual critical decisions 
(Nachmias and  Nachmias, 1981). One reason why an issue was highlighted was 
“other changes” than required by the critical decisions. To test whether an identified 
observation was spurious, we used the term “other changes” as control variable. The 
following question was asked for every identified observation: “Is this observation 
related to other decisions than to one of the actual critical decisions”? If this was the 
case, the observation was considered spurious and excluded from the data. The 
remaining observations were accepted as non-spurious.  
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Data collection and analyses 
Altogether, 154 documents contained relevant information. To illustrate what 
categories of documents that contain information, we use Decision 1 as an example, 
which we show in Table 1.  
 
Category of document 
that contained 
information 
No. of document 
Agenda 7 
Minutes of meeting 19 
Letters 7 
Strategic analyses 17 
Strategy plans 5 
Investment budgets 7 
Monthly reports 19 
Annual statistics 1 
Total: 82 
 
Table 1. Documents containing observations related to decision 1   
 
The left-hand column contains the categories of documents in which we observed 
relevant information. The right-hand column reveals the number of such documents 
per category.  The total number of identified documents that contain relevant 
observations is 82. These documents were collected during the 1994–2000 period. In 
addition, we identified several agendas but did not include them because Decision 1 
was only mentioned as an issue.  
 
The results of our examination of these documents, eliminating the spurious 
observations and the categorization of the non-spurious observations are shown in 
Table 2 : 
 
The non-spurious observations per critical decision and category 
Category: Decision 1: Decision 2: Decision 3: Total no of 
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No. of obs. in 
per-cent of 
N1 
No. of obs. 
in per cent 
of N2 
No. of obs. 




of  Ntot 
Formulation of the decision 3,7 1,9 0,1 1,8 
The reason for the decision  7,3 22,5 7,3 15,3 
Vision and goals for the decision 6,1 21,3 32,1 22,1 
The desired change     
Strategy for achieving the required 
change 
22 21,6 36,8 26,3 
Preconditions for effective 
implementation 
    
Leading change processes     
Potential change powers  1,9  1 
Potential resistance to change     
Planning change processes  0,8  0,4 
Feedback about the overall 
implementation:   
37,7 22,8 11,2 21,7 
Monitoring of further activities 19,5 6,  6,4 
Feedback about management 
involvement 
    
Feedback about achieved change     
Feedback about conflicts 3,7 0,8 5,9 2,8 
Feedback about change powers     
Feedback about resistance to 
change 
    
Evaluations of results  0,4 6,6 2,2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N = (82) (267) (153) (502) 
 
 
                              Table 2: Distribution of observations 
 
Table 2 should be read as follows. In the far left column the categories are listed. The 
second, third, and fourth columns contain the number of non-spurious observations 
per category in percentage of N1, N2, and N3 for the three decisions. The fifth 
column contains the average number of non-spurious observations per category in 
percentage of Ntot. The content of the latter column illustrates the focus of the 
“average board” on the elements underlying the concept of change agent. The content 
of the bottom row but one contains the sum of the distributions in percentage per 
column. The bottom row contains the number of non-spurious observations (i.e. N1, 
N2, N3, and Ntot) for the three critical decisions and the total, respectively. 
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Closer inspection of Table 2 indicates similarities between the content of the columns. 
By calculating the correlation coefficients between the distribution of observations, 
we found that r = 0.73 between columns two and three, r = 0.78 between columns 
three and four, and r = 0.47 betweens column two and four. By squaring the 
correlation coefficients the shared variances are 53.3, 60.8, and 22.1 per cent, 
respectively. This indicates substantial overlap, in particular between columns two 
and three and between columns three and four. These findings indicate similarities in 
how the boards of the two companies focus on the underlying essentials of the change 
agent concept, as well as some differences. The most important similarities are that no 
observations are registered in eight of the categories and only a small percentage of 
observations are registered in three categories. In addition, a large number of 
observations are registered in four categories for all three decisions.  
 
Further inspection of Table 2 reveals a high percentage of observations related to the 
category “Monitoring the overall implementation”.  These findings indicate that 
boards apply traditional, rational, and deterministic approaches.  That is, they focus on 
the reason for the decision, goals, the strategy for implementation and feedback from 
the overall implementation, for the implementation of critical decisions (Nutt, 1986,  
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; Nutt, 1986).  
 
Table 2 also reveals differences in the relative number of observations related to the 
category “Formulation of decision”. The most noteworthy finding is that Company 2 
discussed the formulation of Decision 3 only once. In addition, Table 1 reveals 
differences in the relative number of observations related to the category “The reason 
for the decision”. The most likely reason for these differences lies in the following 
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differences in the nature of the decisions:  Decisions 1 and 3 implied acquisitions of 
companies. Such actions are positive from the acquiring companies’ point of view, 
implying that it was a simple task for the boards of Companies 1 and 2 to 
communicate the reasons for the critical decision internally. In the acquired 
companies, however, the situation would be different. Communicatinge a compelling 
reason for  selling a company is vital in order to minimize the potential internal 
resistance to such major change (Beer, 1990; Eisenstat and Spector, 1990; Eisenhardt 
and Zbaracki, 1992; Mohrman and Mohrman, 1997). Unfortunately, there was no 
information in the database about the internal situations in the acquired companies. 
This implies that the boards of Companies 1 and 2 may have overlooked these 
essential aspects for situations regarding acquisition of other companies. Decision 2 
introduced major changes in the infrastructure and organizational structure of 
Company 1, and the board expected organizational resistance. This expectation 
explains the large number of observations in this category for Decision 2 (see Table I) 
and implies that the board focused on these elements of the change agent concept.  
 
Differences also emerge in the relative number of observations registered in the 
category “Vision and targets”. The reason for these differences in board focus pertains 
partly to the different nature of the decisions and of Company 2 on goal achievement.  
 
Finally, Table 2 reveals major differences in the percentage of observations registered 
in the category “Monitoring further activities”. A reason for these differences could 
pertain to the different nature of the decisions. Furthermore, we registered no 
observations related to Decision 3, which might be because the board monitored this 
merger only over an eight-month period.  
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Conclusions and implications  
In our study, we found a large number of observations in the following four 
categories: the reason for the decision, vision and goals for the decision, strategy for 
achieving the required change, and feedback about the overall implementation. 
Further, the study reveals that the boards overlooked or only modestly focused on 11 
of the 18 identified essentials underlying the change agent concept.  
 
Our findings also reveal that the nature of the critical decisions influences their 
implementation. When the critical decision is limited to internal organizational 
structure and changes, the board can only concentrate on change processes that create 
a momentum for gradually altering the firm’s organizational orientation. When the 
critical decision involves the acquisition of other companies, the board should also 
pay attention to the change processes required in the acquired companies. This 
increases the complexity of the decisions.  
 
The findings also indicate a potential area for improved effectiveness of boards, in 
which they should be more actively involved in the implementation of their critical 
decisions. This could be achieved by applying a change agent approach and by 
stimulating the top management to develop and lead change processes more 
effectively, in line with the insights garnered from the CM discipline. For example, to 
do so, the boards could ask questions that frame and bridge processes that energize 
the top management to apply a change management perspective on execution of the 
implementation (Samara-Fredricks, 2000; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). 
However, it is not evident that boards have the necessary understanding and 
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competence to ask the appropriate questions. On the basis of Mace’s (1971) research, 
Mintzberg (1983, p. 77) claims that board members do not ask discerning questions 
because many lack an understanding of the problems and issues presented to them. 
This lack of understanding may imply a need for board development and training 
before a change agent approach can be implemented effectively.  
 
The present research focuses on three critical decisions that two Norwegian boards 
made. Thus, because of the number of observations, the generalizability of our 
findings might be questioned (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981). However, our 
analyses confirm that there are some similarities in how the two boards made and 
implemented their critical decisions. This suggests that there is some rather general 
way boards implement strategic decisions, e.g. rather little emphasis on problem 
formulation, i.e. the point of departure for the intended change, but much emphasis on 
how to achieve the change. These are interesting observations, leaving room for 
improved decision making. However, more research is needed. Detailed tracking of 
the board´s roles in strategic decisions should be conducted with multiple firms from 
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